NY Times, Wash. Post did not note call for reduced U.S. "footprint" in report on Iraq security forces
SUMMARY: Two New York Times articles and a Washington Post article on a report by the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq did not mention that the report called on the U.S. military to reduce its "footprint" in Iraq because its presence there conveys an "unintended message" of "permanence" as "an occupying force."
In two articles on the release of a report by the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq -- led by retired Marine Gen. James Jones -- and a subsequent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the report, The New York Times did not mention that the report called on the U.S. military to reduce its "footprint" in Iraq because its presence there conveys an "unintended message" of "permanence" as "an occupying force" and that "[s]ignificant reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent." The Times also did not mention that Jones himself echoed the report's conclusion during the September 6 hearing.
Similarly, in a September 7 article reporting that the Jones commission report had received criticism from the U.S. military, The Washington Post noted that Jones had told Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) that "a deadline [for withdrawal from Iraq] of this magnitude would be against our national interest," yet did not mention that Jones had also advocated a reduction in U.S. forces in Iraq. The Post did mention the call for a reduced "footprint" in a September 6 article.
By contrast, in its September 7 article on the hearing and report, the Los Angeles Times noted Jones' assertion during the hearing that "[t]he [military] force footprint should be adjusted in our view to represent an expeditionary capability and to combat the permanent force image of today's presence" in Iraq.
The Jones commission report determined that the Iraqi Security Forces "will be unable to fulfill their essential security responsibilities independently over the next 12-18 months" and that Iraqi police forces have been "ineffective" at securing Iraqi neighborhoods and have been heavily infiltrated by sectarian groups. Moreover, the commission concluded that the U.S. should reduce its "footprint" in Iraq because "[t]he unintended message conveyed is one of 'permanence'":
Perceptions and reality are frequently at odds with each other when trying to understand Iraq's problems and progress. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the impressions drawn from seeing our massive logistics "footprint," our many installations, and the number of personnel (military and civilian), especially in and around the Baghdad region. The unintended message conveyed is one of "permanence", an occupying force, as it were. What is needed is the opposite impression, one that is lighter, less massive, and more expeditionary. The decision to occupy Saddam Hussein's former palace complex with our military headquarters, while expedient in 2003, has most likely given the wrong impression to the Iraqi population. We recommend that careful consideration of the size of our national footprint in Iraq be reconsidered with regard to its efficiency, necessity, and its cost. Significant reductions, consolidations, and realignments would appear to be possible and prudent.
The Los Angeles Times reported on September 7 that during the Senate hearing on the report, Jones called for a reduced presence of U.S. military forces in Iraq:
The U.S. military should reduce its "footprint' in Iraq to counter the impression that it is an occupying force, a prominent retired Marine general said Thursday in congressional testimony that challenged the case for continuing the troop increase backed by the White House.
Just days before the U.S. military commander in Iraq is expected to provide a much more upbeat assessment to Congress, Gen. James L. Jones said the high-profile presence of U.S. troops has engendered animosity among Iraqis, even though the increase has brought some security gains.
"The force footprint should be adjusted in our view to represent an expeditionary capability and to combat the permanent force image of today's presence," Jones told the Senate Armed Services Committee, advocating a smaller, more portable U.S. presence by early next year. "This will make an eventual departure much easier."
Yet in its reports on the Jones commission report and the subsequent hearing, The New York Times did not mention that Jones and the report itself had called for a reduction in the U.S. military's "footprint" in Iraq.
Moreover, while a September 6 Post article on the report noted its concerns about the U.S. "footprint," a subsequent September 7 Post article on the hearing did not mention that Jones had echoed that finding to the Senate despite reporting that Jones had argued against setting a deadline for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq. From the September 6 article:
The report expresses concern about what it calls the massive U.S. military logistical "footprint" in Iraq and its effect on perceptions and problems. "The unintended message conveyed is one of 'permanence,' an occupying force, as it were," the report says. It recommends reconsideration of "efficiency, necessity ... and cost" and calls for "significant reductions, consolidations and realignments" of U.S. forces.
From the September 7 Post article:
Presidential candidates from both parties seized on the report to battle over timelines for troop withdrawal.
Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) asked Jones if a deadline for withdrawal would be in the interest of the United States. "Senator, I'll speak for myself on this, but I think deadlines can work against us," Jones replied. "And I think a deadline of this magnitude would be against our national interest."
But Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) said a deadline would force Iraqi leaders to reconcile their differences. "If we take away deadlines, we take away benchmarks, we take away timelines," she said. "What is the urgency that will move them to act?"
I certainly would advocate a deadline, or any other viable means of changing the focus - in Washington - away from "can we maintain the force long enough to allow Bungle to retire without ever admitting his lies and his defeat?" Since we certainly cannot maintain that force beyond perhaps April - more likely, February - we need sooner rather than later to be examining the options for when we cannot maintain the force.
Any change in perception in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East is pure gravy: we do have enough sense to recognize that we have failed to do some of the things Bungle rashly promised; and sense/guts enough to stop short of killing the very last creature in Mess-O-Potamia.