Both the Associated Press and the Los Angeles Times reported President Bush's March 29 claim that Saddam Hussein was to blame for the sectarian violence in Iraq. But neither news outlet noted that, while the decision to topple Saddam's regime obviously did not create the country's sectarian tensions, the Bush administration bears considerable responsibility for the escalating conflict between the ethnic groups there. Indeed, news reports indicate that the White House not only ignored the intelligence community's prewar assessments that Saddam's removal would likely result in civil war, but rebuffed experts' warnings following the invasion that the country was on such a path.

Addressing nonprofit organization Freedom House in a March 29 speech in Washington, D.C., Bush claimed that “much of the animosity and violence we now see is the legacy of Saddam Hussein”:

BUSH: Today, some Americans ask whether removing Saddam caused the divisions and instability we're now seeing. In fact, much of the animosity and violence we now see is the legacy of Saddam Hussein. He is a tyrant who exacerbated sectarian divisions to keep himself in power.

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As one Middle East scholar has put it, Iraq under Saddam Hussein was “a society slowly and systematically poisoned by political terror. The toxic atmosphere in today's Iraq bears witness to his terrible handiwork.”

The argument that Iraq was stable under Saddam and that stability is now in danger because we removed him is wrong. While liberation has brought its own set of challenges, Saddam Hussein's removal from power was the necessary first step in restoring stability and freedom to the people of Iraq.

A March 29 article by AP staff writer Deb Riechmann, "Bush Blames Saddam for Iraq Instability," focused on this portion of the speech. Riechmann contrasted Bush's claim with a comment Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid (NV) made at a March 29 press conference announcing the Democratic Party's new national security strategy: “The president can give all the speeches he wants, but nothing will change the fact that his Iraq policy is wrong.” But at no point in the article did Riechmann counter Bush's argument that Saddam was to blame for the current security situation in Iraq.

Similarly, in a March 30 article on the Democratic national security platform, Los Angeles Times staff writer Ronald Brownstein uncritically reported Bush's claim that “the sectarian violence in Iraq was not the result of the U.S. invasion”:

The Democratic blueprint was released as Bush continued a heightened effort to shore up public support for his Iraqi policy.

Speaking at a Washington gathering sponsored by the Freedom House, a nonpartisan group that promotes democracy, Bush said the sectarian violence in Iraq was not the result of the U.S. invasion, but “is the legacy of Saddam Hussein.”

The former Iraqi dictator, Bush argued, “exacerbated sectarian divisions to keep himself in power” and created the animosities fueling the bloodshed between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

Riechmann and Brownstein could have challenged Bush's assertion in a number of ways. For instance, they could have requested a response from prominent Democrats such as Sens. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (DE), Robert Byrd (WV), or Barbara Mikulski (MD), all of whom expressed concern in late 2002 that the proposed invasion of Iraq would foment a civil war.

They could also have noted that during the buildup to war, the administration reportedly ignored warnings of the sectarian violence likely to follow a U.S. invasion. As an August 14, 2003, Boston Globe article reported, a prewar assessment from the CIA “concluded that Iraqi society and history showed little evidence to support the creation of democratic institutions” due to the country's “history of repression and war; clan, tribal and religious conflict.” The Globe noted that a State Department assessment “came to the same conclusion.” Despite these concerns, the administration continued to offer the American public optimistic predictions of the postwar situation in Iraq.

Such concerns led intelligence agencies to oppose certain proposals for establishing a stable Iraqi government. In an article in the January/February 2004 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows reported that the CIA, in devising a plan for the formation of a postwar government in Iraq, opted against “a process like the Bonn conference, which was then being used to devise a post-Taliban regime for Afghanistan,” because the CIA “believed that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow, that a similarly quick transfer of sovereignty would only invite chaos.”

In a January 2003 report, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College -- which studies military actions and provides detailed analyses of potential conflicts -- warned that “tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, and tribal communities” would complicate postwar efforts. The report went on to advise against disbanding the Iraqi army, which it described as “one of the few forces for unity within the country”:

Iraq political institutions have never been well-developed, and Iraq has a strong tradition of instability and violence in resolving political disputes. The instability was brought under control and violence institutionalized only after Saddam Hussein achieved power and established a regime of unprecedented brutality. Pre-Saddam instability may emerge in the aftermath of the dictator's removal. In particular, tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, and tribal communities are expected to complicate both the occupation and efforts to build a viable postwar government. Power-sharing among groups is a new and untested concept in Iraq that could well be subverted by elite political instincts to struggle for power before rivals achieve opportunities to consolidate their own gains. Also, while a struggle for power between civilian and military elites is possible and could contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the U.S. should recognize that the military is a national institution and one of the few forces for unity within the country.

But the Bush administration chose not to heed the advice offered by the CIA or the Army War College. Two months after the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the entire Iraqi army, a move that contributed to the destabilization of the country and fueled the growing insurgency. Further, the administration made transfer of sovereignty a major priority, despite the CIA's advice against a quick turnover of power.

Following the invasion, the White House reportedly continued to ignore concerns that sectarian conflicts could erupt into a civil war. For instance, the administration is known to have received two National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) that warned of an impending civil war. The October 2003 NIE predicted that the Iraq insurgency “was likely to worsen and could lead to civil war.” The chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the time, Robert Hutchings, has described the administration as unwilling “to pay attention to analysis that didn't conform to [its] own optimistic scenarios.” A July 2004 NIE reportedly outlined “three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005, with the worst case being developments that could lead to civil war.”

Moreover, Bush's attempt to lay responsibility for the violence in Iraq at Saddam's feet provided news outlets with an opportunity to note that a leaked British memo depicts Bush, six weeks before the start of the war, expressing skepticism that conflicts would erupt between Iraq's various ethnic groups. The memo describes a January 31, 2003, meeting between Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. From the March 27 New York Times article that described the document's contents:

The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush predicted that it was “unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups.” Mr. Blair agreed with that assessment.