Rove claims Senate report said Bush statements were backed up by intelligence

From Pages 340-341 of Courage and Consequence:

So, then, did Bush lie us into war? Absolutely not.

[...]

From my perch inside the West Wing -- but outside the frantic activity in the Situation Room -- I could see the care everyone was taking to not overstate the case or exaggerate the danger. The president emphasized this when we reviewed his speeches, and this care was reflected everywhere else in the administration.

[...]

And what about Bush's claims about Saddam Hussein's ties to terrorism? Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other terrorists with ties to al-Qaeda and about Iraq's support for terrorist groups other than al-Qaeda “were substantiated by intelligence information,” according to the Senate Intelligence Committee 2004 report.

Senate report found that Bush made statements that were not substantiated -- or were “contradicted” -- by intelligence

Senate Intel. Committee: Only some Bush statements on Iraq were substantiated by intelligence -- others were not. Rove is presumably referring to a June 5, 2008, Senate Intelligence Committee report examining government officials' pre-war statements about Iraq. (Rove identifies it as a “2004” report in the excerpt above, but he cites the 2008 report in the relevant endnote.) Rove is correct that the committee found that some Bush claims -- specifically, "[s]tatements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other terrorists with ties to al-Qaeda and about Iraq's support for terrorist groups other than al-Qaeda" -- were substantiated by the intelligence at the time. But the committee also concluded that other claims Bush made about Iraq's supposed relationship with Al Qaeda were either “not substantiated” or were “contradicted” by the available intelligence.

Senate Intel. Committee: Bush allegations suggesting “that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership” were “not substantiated by the intelligence.” Directly contradicting Rove's suggestion that the Senate Intelligence Committee found that “Bush's claims about Saddam Hussein's ties to terrorism” were supported by the available intelligence, the committee actually reported that Bush's allegations “that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership” were “not substantiated by the intelligence.” The committee also found that “policymakers' statements” misrepresented the nature of contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda:

(U) Conclusion 12: Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa'ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.

Intelligence assessments, including multiple CIA reports and the November 2002 NIE [National Intelligence Estimate], dismissed the claim that Iraq and al-Qa'ida were cooperating partners. According to an undisputed INR [State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research] footnote in the NIE, there was no intelligence information that supported the claim that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to al-Qa'ida. The credibility of the principal intelligence source behind the claim that Iraq had provided al-Qa'ida with biological and chemical weapons training was regularly questioned by DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], and later by the CIA. The Committee repeats its conclusion from a prior report that “assessments were inconsistent regarding the likelihood that Saddam Hussein provided chemical and biological weapons (CBW) training to al-Qa'ida.”

(U) Conclusion 13: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq's contacts with al-Qa'ida were substantiated by intelligence information. However, policymakers' statements did not accurately convey the intelligence assessments of the nature of these contacts, and left the impression that the contacts led to substantive Iraqi cooperation or support of al-Qa'ida.

Senate Intel. Committee: Bush statements indicating Saddam was prepared to give WMD to terrorists were “contradicted by available intelligence.” The Senate Intelligence Committee wrote:

(U) Conclusion 15: Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorists groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.

The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Saddam Hussein did not have nuclear weapons, and was unwilling to conduct terrorist attacks [sic] the US using conventional, chemical or biological weapons at that time, in part because he feared doing so would give the US a stronger case for war with Iraq. This judgment was echoed by both earlier and later intelligence community assessments. All of these assessments noted that gauging Saddam's intentions was quite difficult, and most suggested that he would be more likely to initiate hostilities if he felt that a US invasion was imminent.