The conservative media caricature of judicial nominee Goodwin Liu is clear. Media figures have twisted Liu's record to claim he is a left-wing radical who will impose reparations and is "against private ownership of property" regardless of what the text of the Constitution says. Indeed, a New York Times article on conservative opposition to Liu reported that some conservatives say that Liu's approach to constitutional interpretation “enables judges to impose their own political values.” In fact, in the book cited as evidence of this claim, Liu and his co-authors explicitly state that their approach “does not give judges unchecked power to determine what society's values are or to impose their own values on society.”

The Times article, headlined “Appeals Court Nominee Ignites a Partisan Battle,” reported: “And a book he co-wrote argues that judges should interpret the Constitution 'in light of the concerns, conditions and evolving norms of our society' -- an approach some conservatives say enables judges to impose their own political values.” However, in the very same sentence of the book, Liu and his co-authors, Pamela Karlan and Christopher Schroeder stated that they proposed this method of interpretation “in order to preserve [the] power and meaning” of the Constitution's general principles. Liu, Karlan, and Schroeder wrote: “Fidelity to the Constitution requires judges to ask not how its general principles would have been applied in 1789 or 1868, but rather how those principles should be applied today in order to preserve their power and meaning in light of the concerns, conditions, and evolving norms of our society.”

Later, Liu, Karlan, and Schroeder explained that their approach would not allow judges “to impose their own values on society” or give them “license to disregard text or precedent or to undermine the rule of law”:

Of course, any method of constitutional interpretation can be abused. But when the method of constitutional fidelity just illustrated is conscientiously applied, it does not give judges unchecked power to determine what society's values are or to impose their own values on society. Further, the idea that constitutional meaning is capable of evolving over time is not license to disregard text or precedent or to undermine the rule of law. As we explain below, these criticisms are more often based on caricatures of judicial decision-making than on a careful examination of the methodology that judges actually use. More fundamentally, they misapprehend the character of the Constitution and the role of courts in maintaining its authority and legitimacy as the nation and the world continually change.

Liu, Karlan, and Schroeder also specifically rejected an approach that “unduly minimizes the fixed and enduring character of [the Constitution's] text and principles.”

Furthermore, Liu and his co-authors also explained “when it comes to the many provisions that are phrased as broad and general principles, change rather than constancy in interpretation may be necessary to preserve constitutional meaning over time. 'Sometimes change is essential for fidelity' whereas ”refusing to change in light of changed circumstances would be infidelity.' " For example, they explained that if the Fourth Amendment were limited to its original understanding, warrants would not be necessary for the government to wiretap private telephone conversations. From Keeping Faith With the Constitution:

Justice Brandeis powerfully articulated this point in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, a case examining whether the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments apply to private telephone conversations intercepted by law enforcement through wiretapping. The Court held that, because wiretapping did not involve physical trespass upon the defendant's person or property, it did not implicate a search or seizure as those terms were understood when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. “The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects” and not “voluntary conversations secretly overheard,” the Court said.

Although this view is historically correct insofar as the Framing generation understood Fourth Amendment “searches” to apply only to physical spaces and “seizures” to apply only to physical things, Justice Brandeis was nonetheless right to reject it.

[...]

Justice Brandeis's reasoning in Olmstead, later vindicated in Katz v. United States, demonstrates how a changed interpretation in response to changed circumstances can be an act of fidelity to the Constitution. The text of the document must be construed to have the “capacity of adaptation to a changing world”; otherwise, "[r]ights declared in words may be lost in reality."

These aren't the words of people eager to impose his own political views rather than follow the law as a judge. Rather, these are quotes from a serious book by constitutional scholars articulating a mainstream view of constitutional interpretation.